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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XXI APRIL, 1936 No. 3
A CONSIDERATION OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO LIFE
INSURANCE AGENTS' RENEWAL COMMISSIONS
BY J. R. BURCHAM
The retirement during the depression era, either voluntarily
or involuntarily, of a relatively greater number of life insurance
companies than in the course of normal times', has necessarily
precipitated the wholesale termination of the agency contracts
of as many companies, with some far-reaching effects.
One consequence has been that with the liquidation of the re-
tiring company, which usually follows after the reinsurance, sale,
consolidation or merger of its business, the agent, with his can-
celled contract in his hand, and as a victim of circumstances,
either has been deprived entirely of his covenanted renewal com-
missions at a time when he feels he needs them the most, or
else as a child of fortune, he is left to glean the crumbs which
may fall from the table of the liquidating authorities or from
the succeeding company, after the interests of the policyholder
have first been adequately served.2
Not infrequently the erstwhile agent, disgruntled at being
stripped of his renewal commissions, sues his contracting com-
pany or its liquidating agents, or even the successor company,
for an accounting of his renewals as they accrue, or more often
for damages equivalent to the present value of his future renewal
commissions.
As an aftermath of this recent liquidation of certain com-
panies, resulting in a sweeping termination of their agency con-
See Best, Life Insurance Reports 44-65 (1935).
2See Daniel vs. Layton (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 1935, for example
of case where reinsurance plan highly favorable to policyholders was upheld,
notwithstanding contentions of former agents, claiming renewal commis-
sions, that such plan was discriminatory in that it deprived them of equal
participation with policyholders in division of assets.
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tracts, and the consequent dilemma of the agent with respect to
his renewal commissions, both company and agent are today
confronted with some paramount problems pertaining to renewal
commissions, which heretofore, if existent at all, were on a rela-
tively minute scale, were largely transitory, and soon passed
away.
With one exception subsequently noted, this paper will be con-
fined to an analysis of what may be denoted as the "major de-
pression problems" growing out of agents' claims for renewal
commissions, with which the attorney representing the agent,
as well as counsel for either the liquidating company or its suc-
cessor company, will most likely, sooner or later, be obliged to
cope.
A consideration of the following questions may afford some
basis for the solution of the more important of these problems.
I. Does the disability of a company to engage in business,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, per se constitute an
actionable breach of the company's agreement to pay com-
missions on renewal premiums subsequent to the termina-
tion of the agency contract?
II. Does that stipulation of the agency agreement for the
payment of renewal commissions after the termination of
the agency, create a contract of such a nature as to be sub-ject to the doctrine of anticipatory breach?
III. Does the agent, to the extent of his renewal commis-
sions, have a vested interest in, or an equitable lien on re-
newal premiums collected after termination of the agency,
which will enable him to follow such premiums into the
hands of whomsoever may collect them, including the suc-
cessor company?3
3 Certain collateral problems arising in connection with agency renewal
commissions which seemed to be less timely and to lend themselves more
readily to solution by application of the fundamentals of agency and con-
tract law, are not treated herein for want of space.
Thus on the question of rights to renewal commissions where the contract
is for a fixed term, see MacGregor v. Union Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1903)
121 F. 493; Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1876) 61 Mo. 534; Israel
v. Northwestern National Life Ins. (1910) 111 Minn. 404, 127 N. W. 187;
Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Coleman (1907) 118 Tenn. 21 . 100 S. W.
122.
Where the contract is terminated by the agent's death, see Mills v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co. (1899) 77 Miss. 327, 28 So. 954.
Where the agency is terminated for the fault or misconduct of the agent,
see Chase v. New York Life (1905) 188 Mass. 271, 74 N. E. 325; Burleson
v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1890) 86 Cal. 342, 24 Pac. 1064;
Security Mutual Life v. Frankel (1910) 46 Ind. App. 212, 92 N. E. 183;
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A perusal of the agency contracts now in use by a number of
the companies reveals remarkable standardization in that their
basic provisions contain in common the following pertinent arti-
cles and limitations:
1. That the contract is terminable at the will of either
party, usually on 30 or 60 days notice.
2. That commissions based on first year and renewal pre-
miums will be allowed as and when premiums are paid in
cash to the company.
3. That on termination of the contract, for any reason, the
company will continue to pay renewal commissions, usually
subject however, to the deduction of a collection fee of a
given percentage of the premium.
Therefore, in order to avoid repeated references to exceptions,
and for the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that the
contracts under consideration are the customary agency contracts
now in use, and that they contain in effect the provisions just
enumerated.
I. DISABILITY OF THE COMPANY AS A BREACH OF THE
AGENCY AGREEMENT TO PAY RENEWAL COMMISSIONS
AFTER AGENCY TERMINATION
Of special interest is that class of cases where, by interposition
of the state, the company has been declared insolvent and dis-
solved, or where it has been voluntarily liquidated, and the former
agent sues for the present worth of his future renewal commis-
sions on the ground that the cessation of the company's business
has constituted a breach of its agreement to pay commissions on
renewal premiums after the termination of the contract.
Seldom does an agency contract specifically provide that the
company reserves the right to cease doing business. What then,
is the effect on the agent's claim to future renewal commissions
provided for in his contract, where his company is incapacitated
from collecting renewal premiums by either a voluntary retire-
Andrews v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1902) 24 Ky. L. 844, 70 S. W. 43; Jacobson
v. Connecticut Mutual (1895) 61 Minn. 330, 63 N. W. 740; Armstrong v.
National Life Ins. Co. (1908) 112 S. W. 327; Barton v. Travelers Ins. Co.(1909) 84 S. C. 209, 66 S. E. 118; Aldrich v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1923)
235 N. Y. 214, 139 N. E. 245.
Where the agent was wrongfully discharged by the company, see Wells v.
National Life Assn. (C. C. A. 5th, 1900) 99 F. 22; Aetna Life v. Nexsen
(1882) 84 Ind. 347; Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life (1876) 61 Mo. 534; New-
comb v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1892) 51 F. 725.
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ment and sale of its business to another company, or by the inter-
vention of the state in enjoining the company from the further
carrying on of business? Does the company on becoming a party
to the agency contract, by implication, agree to continue in busi-
ness and collect renewal premiums forever, simply to assure the
agent of his renewal commissions after his contract is terminated,
even though in the opinion of the company or state, it becomes
unwise, unprofitable or impossible to continue doing business? 4
The courts in several reported cases have been called upon to
answer these questions.
Thus, in the leading case of Moore v. Security Trust & Life
Insurance Company,5 the company conveyed all of its assets to
another company and ceased to do business. Suit was brought
by the agent against the selling company for damages equivalent
to the alleged present value of his renewal commissions under a
contract which provided for the payment of renewals accruing
after its termination, but made no specific reservation of the
right to cease to do business. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held in no uncertain language that the possibility of the
company disabling itself from collecting future renewal pre-
miums and continuing in the insurance business, was a chance
4 According to the weight of authority, unless the contract expressly
provides for commissions on renewals to be paid after employment termina-
tion, the agent will not be entitled to commissions on renewal premiums paid
after the termination of his agency. Federal; Stagg v. Insurance Co. (1871)
10 Wall. 589, 19 L. Ed. 1038; Fabian v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
(D. C. D. Minn. 1935) 5 F. Supp. 806; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Washington
Life Ins. Co. (D. C. D. Md., 1912) 193 F. 512. Burleson v. Northwestern
Mutual Ins. Co. (1890) 86 Cal. 342, 24 Pac. 1064; Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Holloway (1883) 51 Conn. 310, 50 Am. Rep. 21; Scott v. Travelers
Ins. Co., (1906) 103 Md. 69, 63 At]. 377; Chase v. New York Life (1905)
188 Mass. 271, 74 N. E. 325; Jacobson v. Connecticut Mutual Life (1895)
61 Minn. 330, 63 N. W. 740; Bone v. New York Life (1925) 165 Minn. 327,
206 N. W. 452; Mills v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1899) 77 Miss. 327,
28 So. 954; Arensmeyer v. Metropolitan (1914) 254 Mo. 363, 162 S. W. 261;
King v. Raleigh (1902) 100 Mo. App. 1, 70 S. W. 251; North Carolina Ins.
Co. v. Williams (1884) 91 N. C. 69; Ballard v. Insurance Co. (1896) 119
N. C. 187, 25 S. E. 956; Wagner v. Land (1931) 152 Okla. 225, 4 Pac. (2d)
81.
Contra: Schrimplin v. Farmers Life Assn. (1904) 123 Iowa 102, 98 N. W.
613; Hercules Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brinker (1879) 77 N. Y. 435; Heyn
v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1907) 118 App. Div. 194, 103 N. Y. S. 20;
Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Coleman (1907) 118 Tenn. 215, 100 S.
W. 122.
Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 168 F. 496,
Certiorari denied by United States Supreme Court (1910), 219 U. S. 583, 55
L. Ed. 346.
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to which the agent subjected himself in entering the agency
agreement, and that since the contract was terminable at will,
the company was at liberty to terminate it by sale of its business
without liability to the agent for the present worth of commis-
sions on future renewal premiums which would have been col-
lected by the company had it continued in business. In reaching
this conclusion, the court said:
"It (the company) reserved to itself under the contract of
agency the corporate power and the right to determine its
own business policy, and ... whether or not, and when, if
at all, it would reinsure its risks, turn over its business to
another company, and cease to carry it on, free from any
liability to the plaintiffs for damages on account of the ex-
ercise of that right, and the plaintiffs took the chances of
that exercise when they signed the agreement."6
Where the declaration of insolvency and dissolution of the
company by the sovereign power of the state is the vis major
which disables the company from performance of its agency con-
tract and prohibits the future prosecution of its business, it is
interesting to note that the New York Court of Appeals has held
that the agent has no valid claim against funds in the hands of
the receiver, for damages resulting from the alleged breach of
the contract in causing a discontinuance of his employment, and
assigns the following reason for its decision:
".. . the agreement of the company to pay commissions on
renewals was impliedly conditioned upon the continued ex-
istence of the company and its ability to renew policies and
receive premiums thereon, and was terminated by its dis-
solution."'
In fact, it seems well settled that an adjudication of insolvency
operates in legal effect as a cancellation of all outstanding insur-
6 For other cases holding to the same effect, see particularly, Wheeler v.
Hartford Life Insurance Company (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) 227 F. 369, and
People v. Security Life Insurance Company (1879) 78 N. Y. 114.
In re: English & Scottish Marine Insurance Co. (1870) 5 L. R. Chan.
App. 737, the English Court of Appeals in Chancery where the agency con-
tract was terminated by the company's voluntary retirement from business,
held that the agent had no cause of action against the company for renewal
commissions, which would have accrued to the agent's account had the
company continued in business, since the agent had no "right to determine
what the extent of the business was to be," and that by entering into the
contract "he simply took the chance of the company finding it a profitable
business and carrying on."
7 Hepburn v. Montgomery (1884) 97 N. Y. 617.
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ance policies, 7 with the result that, the power of the company to
receive premiums having been destroyed by the lawful action of
the state, no renewal commissions on such premiums could there-
after become due the agent. In other words, the subject matter
of the contract has ceased to exist.
In the claim of an agent against a receiver for the prospective
value of renewal commissions, based on a charge that the com-
pany itself because of mismanagement and misconduct by its
officers was the responsible cause of the act of the state in dis-
solving it, and therefore that the dissolution was to be deemed
the company's own act (not to be pleaded as an excuse), the New
York Court of Appeals" also has held that whatever may have
provoked or induced the corporate death, the dissolution proceed-
ings must be deemed to be the act of the state and not that of
the company producing its own death, since although the com-
pany may have been insolvent, dissolution was not the necessary
consequence, but was made to depend upon the discretion of the
State Superintendent. The possibility of company dissolution was
held to belong to the contract as an inevitable condition and a
risk which the agent assumed.
While the reported authorities are limited, it is interesting
to note from those just discussed and others cited in the foot-
notes, that the courts with remarkable uniformity, have held that
the disability or incapacity of the company to engage in business
does not of itself constitute an actionable breach of the contract
to pay renewals after the agency termination. It is equally sig-
nificant that the courts in the better reasoned of these opinions
seem to predicate their decisions squarely on the fact that the
agency agreement by its express provisions is a contract termin-
able at the will and pleasure of either party.9 This reason un-
doubtedly has its origin in a conception fundamental to the law
71 People v. Metropolitan Surety Co. (1912) 205 N. Y. 135 98 N. E. 412;
Fuller v. Wright (1917) 147 Ga. 70, 92 S. E. 873; Kate v. American Bonding
& Casualty Co. (1928) 206 Ia. 988, 221 N. W. 585; Evans v. Illinois Surety
Co. (1921) 298 Ill. 101, 131 N. E. 262.
8 People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1883) 91 N. Y. 174, at pages
182 and 183.
9 That, aside from its contractual obligations, the company possesses the
inherent power and corporate right to voluntarily withdraw from business
whenever it so wills, which is an additional reason sometimes ascribed by
the courts in support of the proposition that the company may cease to do
business free from liability for agency renewals, is submitted as being un-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss3/1
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of agency, that the principal may revoke and the agent may re-
nounce the appointment at will without committing any breach
of the contract of agency, unless the power to revoke is restricted
by express covenant.-0
It seems to follow, therefore, that the parties in making the
agency contract expressly terminable at will, have explicitly re-
served to the company the corporate power and right, vital to its
success and existence, to determine whether and for how long it
will continue to do business, to decide to cease doing business
altogether if it deems it necessary or advisable, or to reinsure its
risks, free from liability to its agents, and without the exercise
of such right constituting a breach of that stipulation in the con-
tract to pay commissions on future premiums after its termina-
tion. The contract being made terminable at the pleasure of the
parties, is certainly contemplated by them to be of a temporary
nature and to carry with it no agreement by the company, im-
plied or otherwise, that it will unequivocally continue its busi-
ness, though deemed unwise and unprofitable to do so, nor that
it will refrain from going out of business after the agency termi-
nates.
The soundness of the foregoing conclusion seems further evi-
tenable and unsound. See Hepburn v. Montgomery, supra, footnote 7; In re
English & Scottish Marine Insurance Co., supra, footnote 6; People v.
Security Life Insurance Co., supra, footnote 6.
If the company may retire from business, irrespective of its contractual
undertakings, then it would follow that under a contract of angecy for a
fixed term the company could voluntarily disable itself during the term,
thereby stripping itself of the power to perform its contract, yet escape
liability to the agent for renewal commissions, contrary to the weight of
authority. See United States v. Behan (1884) 110 U. S. 338, 28 L. Ed. 168;
Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1876) 61 Mo. 534; Wells v. National
Life Assn. (C . C. A. 5th, 1900) 99 Fed. 222; Israel v. Northwestern Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. (1910) 111 Minn. 404, 127 N. W. 187; Michigan Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Coleman (1907) 118 Tenn. 215, 100 S. W. 122.
By the same token the company might deliberately abandon its business
and incur no liability to the policyholder for the value of his policy, contrary
to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Lovell vs. St. Louis
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1884) 28 L. Ed. 423, 111 U. S. 264, and Central Trust
Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Assn. (1916) 60 L. Ed. 815, 240 U. S. 581. Also
see Gilbert v. Washington Beneficial Endowment Assn. (1897) 10 App. D. C.
316; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Kerr (1909) 173 Ind. 613, 89 N. E. 398;
Chicago Life v. Robertson (1917) 165 Ky. 217, 176 S. W. 1012; Crowell v.
Northwestern Life & Savings Co. (1906) 99 Minn. 214, 108 N. W. 962.
10 See Moore v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 168 F.
406; Stier v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. W. P. Mo., 1893) 58 F. 843;
North Carolina State Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (1884) 91 N. C. 69.
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dent when we bear in mind two distinct characteristics of the
renewal commissions with which we are concerned:
(1) That they are the renewals which under the terms
of the contract accrue and are allowable only after the con-
tract has been terminated, and,(2) That under the terms of the agency contracts of most
companies such renewals become payable to the agent only
upon payment of the renewal premiums to the company.
A rational interpretation seems to be that the company is bound
to pay renewal commissions only on the renewal premiums paid
to it, and only when they are paid. Where, therefore, the com-
pany either voluntarily or involuntarily has ceased to do business,
that act has merely wrought a disability to receive payment of
such premiums; a contract right, which as hereinbefore indi-
cated, the parties reserved to the company in making the contract
terminable at will, and a hazard which the agent risked.
In the opinion of the writer, it is not sufficient to say that the
company may cease to do business without incurring liability to
the agent for renewals simply because the contract is found to
be terminable at will, or even more specifically, when this con-
clusion is made to rest upon the further premise that if the com-
pany is deprived of its power to receive renewal premiums by
reason of its cessation from business, the agent is likewise
stripped of his right to receive renewal commissions, since, as
previously noted, under the standard provisions of most agency
contracts, renewal commissions are payable to the agent only as
and when renewal premiums are paid in cash to the company.
Therefore, even though an agency contract may be terminated
properly under a provision making it terminable at will, so long
as the company is not actually incapacitated from receiving pre-
miums, but remains in business and continues to receive the pay-
ment of renewal premiums, its contract obligation to pay the
former agent renewal commissions on the basis of such renewal
premiums paid, remains intact.
Thus for example, in the case of Newcomb v. Imperial Life
Insurance Co.,1 the agent's contract said to be terminable at will,
had been cancelled and the agent was being paid his renewal com-
missions after deduction of a collection fee, under that provision
Il Supra, note 3.
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of his contract providing for the payment of renewals subse-
quent to the agency termination. While the former agent was
thus receiving his renewals, the company entered upon a scheme
to induce people whom the agent had insured on a "natural pre-
mium plan" to give up and abandon their policies for "level pre-
mium policies." The Federal Court held that the company had
no right to interpose such obstacles in the way of the renewal
of the policies so as to deprive the agent of his renewal commis-
sions on such policies, and that such action could not be justified
on the grounds that the company may have reserved the right to
terminate the contract at will, but that so long as the company
had the capacity to receive renewal premiums, it was, subject to
the time limitations of the contract, obligated to pay the former
agent his renewals.
It is suggested, therefore, that the fact that the contract is
made expressly terminable at will, properly should be available
to the company or its successors as a defense to a claim for re-
newals after the agency termination, only where there is a con-
currence of two facts: first, the destruction of the power to re-
ceive renewal premiums, precipitated by, secondly, the disability
of the company to do business.
As a conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the contractual
right of the agent to renewal commissions after the termination
of his agency ceases upon the disability of the company to en-
gage in business, whether by voluntary retirement or by sover-
eign compulsion. The soundness of this conclusion, however, in
the opinion of the writer, rests, not on the premise intimated by
some of the courts that aside from its contracts a company pos-
sesses the inherent right to discontinue business when it wills,
but upon the more feasible and convincing precept that the
parties, in making their contract expressly terminable at will,
have anticipated the possible disability of the company to con-
tinue in business, and its consequent inability to receive payment
of the premiums upon which the renewal commissions are mea-
sured and based.
The foregoing conclusions are to be understood as being not
necessarily inconsistent with, but rather distinguishable from,
that further line of cases which holds that where an insurance
company makes an express agreement to employ an agent for a
fixed term, the contract is essentially mutually obligatory and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the company breaks its part of the agreement and subjects itself
to all the damages which naturally flow from that breach by
abandoning its business during the agreed term.12
II. ANTICIPATORY BREACH
As previously indicated, most agency contracts provide for
payment, subsequent to the termination of the agency agreement,
of renewal commissions as and when renewal premiums are paid
to and collected by the company. It is the loss of these renewal
commissions on the withdrawal of a company from business that
frequently prompts the agent to file suit against his original com-
pany, or its successor, for the present worth of estimated future
renewal commissions, before the renewal premiums actually have
become due or have been collected. These actions are usually
brought on the theory that since the company, by its dissolution
or voluntary cessation from business, has prevented the payment
of renewal commissions before the time for performance, the
agent may sue immediately for damages on the theory of antici-
patory breach.-
With the problem thus stated, let us consider and apply the two
elements necessary to sustain a suit for anticipatory breach.
1. The absolute and unequivocal renunciation of the contract,
covering its entire performance, is an essential factor to an
action for anticipatory breach.14
Suffice it to say, therefore, that the theory of anticipatory
breach can be invoked in a demand for renewal commissions only
in case the contract purported to be repudiated by the company,
is a mutual executory contract for a fixed period, and under the
terms of which the company is unequivocally bound to continue
in business and to receive payment of the future renewal pre-
miums on which renewal commissions are based.
But as previously indicated, the great majority of agency
contracts are expressly terminable at will, with the result that
12 MacGregor v. Union Life Insurance Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 121 F.
403; Lewis v. Insurance Co. (1876) 61 Mo. 534; Israel v. Northwestern
National Life Ins. Co. (1910) 111 Minn. 404, 127 N. W. 187.13MacGregor v. Union Life Insurance Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) 121 F.
493; Lewis v. Insurance Co. (1876) 61 Mo. 534; Lovell v. St. Louis Mutual
Life Ins. Co. (1884) 111 U. S. 264, 28 L. Ed. 423; Roehm v. Horst (1900)
178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953.14 McNamarra v. Cerf (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 4 F. (2d) 997; Roehm v.
Horst (1900) 178 U. S. 1; Dingley v. Olar (1886) 117 U. S. 490, 29 L. Ed
984; Mobley v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1934) 79 L. Ed. 936.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss3/1
LIFE INSURANCE AGENTS' RENEWAL COMMISSIONS 195
their termination through liquidation or reinsurance of the com-
pany and its subsequent inability to collect premiums and to
pay commissions on them, does not constitute a repudiation of
the contract by the company thus giving rise to a demand for
anticipatory breach; but to the contrary, termination of the
agency contract is but the exercise of a right by the company,
reserved to it under its contract.15
There is said, however, to be another reason why the termina-
tion of the customary agency contract providing for payment of
renewals subsequent to its termination, will not support an action
for anticipatory breach, and this leads us to a consideration of
the second attribute essential to a demand for anticipatory
breach.
2. The authorities as far back as the old English case of
Hochster v. De La Tour,e adhere to the doctrine that a breach of
the contract before the time of performance arrives, justifies an
immediate action for damages only on contracts which are bilat-
eral and mutually executory, such as contracts for the rendition
of services, or marriage, where the undertakings of the parties
are interdependent and to be simultaneously performed. 7 This
rule, however, does not seem to govern actions to pay money at
times specified, such as on bonds and notes, where the considera-
tion has passed, and where, as a consequence the contract is only
executory as to one party. 8
I Moore v. Security Trust & Life Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 168 F. 496;
Pellet v. Manufacturers' and Merchants' Insurance Co. (C. C. A. 7th, 1900)
104 F. 502; Stier v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo., 1893) 58 F.
843; Wheeler v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) 227 F. 369;
E. I. Dupont & Co. v. Clairborne-Reno Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) 64 Fed. (2d)
224; 3 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1929), sec. 561, pages 1805
and 1806.
16 (1853) 2 El. and BI. 678.
17Hochster v. De La Tour (1853) 2 El. and Bl. 678; Roehm v. Horst
(1900) 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953; Nichols v. Steel Co. (1893) 137 N. Y.
471, 33 N. E. 561; Frost v. Knight (1871) L. R. 7 Ex. 111.
Is The repudiation by one party, it is said, must have been accepted or
"acted upon" by the other party to his detriment, to give rise to a present
action for anticipatory breach. The contract must necessarily, therefore, be
mutually executory, since the party accepting the repudiation cannot act
upon it unless there remains something for him to do under the contract.
Roehm v. Horst (1900) 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953; Nichols v. Steel Co.
(1893) 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561; Washington County v. Williams ( C. C.
A. 8th, 1901) 111 F. 801; Kimmel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A.
10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 921; Kitchcort v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (D. C.
W. D. Mo., 1932) 1 F. Supp. 719; Moore v. Security Trust & Life Co.
(C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 168 F. 496; Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co. (D. C.
W. D. Mo., 1932) 59 F. (2d) 736.
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Where, therefore, the agency contract has been terminated, it
has been held, though subject to considerable controversy, that
the agent has completely performed his part of the contract, hav-
ing fully earned his commissions, so that nothing remains execu-
tory but the agreement of the company to pay commissions, usu-
ally subject to a collection fee, as and when renewal premiums
are collected by it in the future."
It is submitted, therefore, that under a contract stipulation for
the payment of renewal commissions after agency termination,
the disability of the company to collect premiums and to pay
renewal commissions thereon, does not accelerate the due date of
said renewal commissions, and creates no cause of action for
their present worth on the theory of anticipatory breach.
As to the agent's right, on termination of his contract, to re-
cover the worth of his renewal commissions by suit based on
quantum meruit or quantum valebat for services rendered, the
adjudications are few.
However, where the contract is terminable at will, quantum
meruit or quantum vatebat seemingly will not lie, for as said in
the Newcomb case,20
"It goes without saying that an agent working under such
a contract cannot sue his principal upon a quantum valebat
for services rendered, if the agency is lawfully terminated
by the principal in pursuance of a power reserved in the con-
tract to terminate it."
Recovery on a quantum meruit is said to be based upon an
implied promise to pay for the rendition of services,2 1 but where
there exists an express contract there can of course be no such
implied agreement as to the same subject matter.22 Where, there-
fore, the right to terminate the contract and the right of the
agent to renewal commissions on the basis of premiums collected,
are expressly fixed by the agency contract, the required implied
19 Moore v. Security Trust & Life Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) 168 F. 496;
Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1932) 59 F. (2d) 736;
Mellon v. Fed. Ins. Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1926) 14 F. (2d) 997.2 0 Newcomb v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1892) 51 F. 725.
2171 C. J. 37; Sargent v. Foland (1922) 104 Ore. 296, 207 Pac. 349; In
re Walton's Estate (1931) 213 Iowa 104, 238 N. WV. 577; Callaway v.
Milligan (1911) 25 Del. 383, 80 Atl. 630.
22 13 C. J. 243-and cases cited.
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contract essential to support a quantum meruit does not appear
to exist.23
III. CLAIM OF AGENT TO VESTED INTEREST IN RENEWAL
PREMIUMS TO THE EXTENT OF RENEWAL COMMISSIONS
In the foregoing discussion our concern has been primarily
with actions by the agent for renewal commissions against the
original contracting company or its liquidating agents, where that
company has been incapacitated from performance of the agency
contract by virtue of its withdrawal from business, whether vol-
untary or involuntary.
However, the retirement from business of a number of legal
reserve life companies in recent years, and the consequent whole-
sale purchase or reinsurance of their businesses by succeeding
companies, has caused an increasing number of actions by the
former agent of the retiring company against the purchasing
company, for renewal commissions to which, under the terms of
the basic contract of the original company, the agent would have
been entitled, had the original company remained in business and
continued to collect renewal premiums.
What can be the basis of liability, if any, of the successor com-
pany to the former agent of the original company? In the ab-
sence of an express undertaking by the successor company in its
contract of purchase or reinsurance, to pay the former agent all
or a part of the renewals which would accrue to him had his
agency contract with the original company not been terminated,
does the purchasing company by virtue alone of its collection,
under its purchase agreement, of renewal premiums on business
written by the former agent of the old company, incur any lia-
bility to such agent for renewal commissions on such premiums?
If, as previously concluded, no liability on the grounds of
breach of contract to pay renewals, attaches against the original
23 It is said, however, that if the express contract has been completely
executed, the agent may recover as upon an implied contract, the price of his
services, "but the contract must regulate the amount of the recovery"; Kelso
v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. (1932) 227 Mo. App. 184, 51 S. W. (2d)
203; Hoyt v. Buder (1928) 318 Mo. 1155, 6 S. W. (2d) 947; Oaks v. Short,
(Mo. App., 1927) 292 S. W. 738; 13 C. J. 244. Even so, in view of the'fact
that the express contract still regulates the amount of the recovery, a
quantum meruit apparently would not lie since there could be no recovery
of any amount on the basis of the express contract, it having terminated,
with the result that the company is incapable of receiving premiums, upon
the payment of which commissions under the contract are made to depend.
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company when it is incapacitated from performance of its agency
contract, then certainly, as against the successor company, the
former agent can find himself in no better position.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that any such claim against
the purchasing company must be predicated upon the premise
that the agent has a vested interest, a property right, or an equi-
table lien on renewal premiums paid, to the extent of his commis-
sions, which enables him to follow said premiums into the hands
of whomsoever may collect them, and to claim his commission
interest therein.
To ascertain whether the agent has such a vested interest in
renewal premiums collected by the successor company, it is first
necessary to determine whether as against the original company,
the agent had ever acquired an interest in renewal premiums
which vested with the collection of such premiums.
The fundamental rule that an agency terminable at will may
be revoked by the principal without committing a breach of the
contract of agency, is said to admit of one exception. Where the
agent acquires an interest, not in the profits of the thing but in
the subject matter of the agency itself, that is, where there exists
a power coupled with an interest, the customary option of the
principal to terminate the agency, is said to be taken away.24
Chief Justice Marshall, with characteristic aptness, defined a
power coupled with an interest as "an interest in the thing it-
self," saying further, that "if the power ceases where the inter-
est commences" the power cannot be said to be coupled with an
interest, and that
"the interest or title in the thing being vested in the person
who gives the power, remains in him, unless it be conveyed
with the power...,, 25
Tested by this rule it seems manifest that the power which is
accorded the agent under his contract to solicit and service in-
surance risks, is not such a power as is coupled with an interest
in the subject matter, that is, in the premiums themselves; but
rather, is it not a case in which "the power ceases where the in-
24 Steir v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo., 1893) 58 F. 843;
Hunt v. Rousmanier (1923) 8 Wheat, 174, 5 L. Ed. 589; Locher v. New York
Life Ins. Co. (1918) 200 Mo. App. 659, 208 S. W. 862; North Carolina State
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (1884) 91 N. C. 69; Kansas Union Life v. Burman,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1905) 141 F. 835.25 Hunt v. Rousmanier (1823) 8 Wheat. 174, 5 L. Ed. 589.
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terest commences?" The company by contract confers upon the
agent only the power to write and service business, whereupon
the power of the agent ceases. As compensation for his services
in exercising this power, the company does not purport to convey
to the agent an actual interest in the premiums themselves, but
instead, the company contracts to use the premiums as and when
collected as simply a medium for the measurement of the com-
missions to be paid.
It is submitted, therefore, that the contract provisions for pay-
ment of renewal commissions do not vest the agent with an in-
herent interest in the premiums by whomsoever collected, but
can only be understood as fixing a basis of remuneration, a yard-
stick for measuring the compensation which the company under-
takes to make the agent when and if premiums are paid to the
company, and not otherwise.26 In other words, the company be-
comes liable to the agent for his renewals only in the capacity
of debtor, not taking the renewal premiums impressed with the
trust for the benefit of the agent.2 Only so long as the contract-
ing company continues in business and to collect premiums, can
the agent, after the agency termination, recover his renewals as
they accrue, and then only in the capacity of a creditor of the
company under a promise to pay money for services rendered.
Therefore, though the subject be approached from a different
aspect, are we not impelled to the same conclusion previously
announced in Part I, that upon a company's discontinuance from
business, which works a disability to collect renewal premiums,
the agency contract, if terminable at will, ends, and all rights of
the agent thereupon expire, notwithstanding that subsequent pre-
miums on the former agent's business may be paid to and re-
ceived by a succeeding company under a contract of purchase or
reinsurance?
As a general rule, both the federal and state courts have held
that the right to renewal commissions is an unaccrued, prospec-
tive, contingent right which must be derived from the contract
26 Locher v. New York Life (1918) 200 Mo. App. 659, 208 S. W. 862;
Kansas Union Life v. Burman (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) 141 F. 835; North
Carolina State Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (1884) 91 N. C. 69.
27 North Carolina State Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, supra, note 26; Kansas
Union Life v. Burman, supra, note 26; Gooding v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. (1912) 110 Me. 69, 85 AtI. 391.
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itself, 18 and is in no sense a vested right of the agent either as
against the original company or as against the succeeding com-
pany.
Thus in the case of Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Thompson,2' the plaintiff had taken over the company's agency
at Rochester, New York under a contract to allow him a 71/%
collection fee on renewal premiums. Subsequently the company
discontinued the agency and notified policyholders to remit di-
rectly to the company's home office. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals stated the question as follows:
"The question of law is presented whether under the original
contract Thompson had, as he claimed, a vested interest for
commissions on renewal premiums on policies obtained by
the Rochester agency...
and held,
"Thompson had no vested interest but only a right to a col-
lection fee on premiums collected by him in cash...
saying further,
"the general rule is that contracts not expressly made for
fixed periods are terminable at the will of either party....
the table of premiums and commissions must be understood
as fixing commissions payable in accordance with the terms
of the contract."
Previously, the Federal Circuit Court,30 after quoting Chief
Justice Marshall's definition of a power coupled with an interest,
had held that the contract right of an insurance agent to renewal
commissions does not make his agency coupled with an interest
so as to prevent the company from terminating it at will.
So in the case of Locher v. New York Life Insurance Co.,31
the St. Louis (Missouri) Court of Appeals held, where the agent
was claiming renewals after the termination of his agency under
a contract terminable at will, that he
2sMasden v. Travelers Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 75;
Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Tiernan (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) 263 F. 325;
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hermann (1928) 154 Md. 171, 140 At]. 64; Chase v.
New York Life Ins. Co. (1905) 188 Mass. 271, 74 N. E. 325; Sutherland v.
Connecticut Mutual Life (1914) 149 N. Y. S. 1008.
29 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) 266 F. 873.
30 Stier v. Imperial Life Ins. Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo., 1893) 58 F. 843.
31 (1918) 200 Mo. App. 659, 208 S. W. 862.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss3/1
LIFE INSURANCE AGENTS' RENEWAL COMMISSIONS 201
"has acquired no interest in renewals on policies written by
him which become vested at the time of writing the policies."
The court went on to say that
"this claim was long ago disposed of by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Hunt v. Rousmanier,"
and also quoted Chief Justice Marshall's familiar definition of
a power coupled with an interest.
In Wilkinson v. Inter-Southern Life Insurance Co., 32 the agent
had a contract with the Citizens National Life Insurance Com-
pany. While the contract was in force the company merged with
another company and formed the Inter-Southern Life Insurance
Co. The agent sued the Inter-Southern Life Insurance Company
for the present cash value of renewal commissions which would
have accrued to the plaintiff had the consolidation not occurred.
In finding for the company, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
since the agency contract made no provision for its duration for
a fixed term, but was expressly terminable at will,
"the fact that the Citizens National Life Insurance Company
entered into a consolidation with the Inter-Southern Life
Insurance Company did not constitute a breach of the con-
tract of agency for which Wilkinson could recover damages."
Without minimizing the effects of other decisions holding that
the agent's interest in renewals is contingent and not vested, such
additional authorities, for the sake of brevity, are referred to in
the footnotesA3
Assuming as a conclusion therefore, that the right of the agent
to renewal commissions is by its nature not a vested right but
rests expressly upon the contract, which creates only a debtor
and creditor relationship under a contingent promise to pay for
32 (1917) 147 Ga. 283, 93 S. E. 406.
3" Madsen v. Travelers Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 75;
McPherrin v. Sun Life Assurance Co. (Iowa, 1934) 257 N. W. 316;
Thurman v. Rodman (1924) 206 Ky. 180, 266 S. W. 1047; Gooding v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1912) 110 Me. 69, 85 Atl. 391; Scott v.
Travelers Ins. Co. (1906) 103 Md. 69, 63 Atl. 377; King v. Raleigh (1902)
100 Mo. App. 1, 70 S. W. 251; North Carolina State Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams (1884) 91 N. C. 69; Ballard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 N. C. 187,
local citation 191, 25 S. E. 956; Fass v. South Atlantic Life Ins. Co. (1916)
105 S. C. 107, 89 S. E. 558.
But for cases distinguishable, not Contra see: Hercules Mutual Life
Assurance Society v. Brinker, 77 N. Y. 435; Heyn v. New York Life (1908)
192 N. Y. 1, 84 N. E. 725; Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Coleman (1907)
118 Tenn. 215, 100 S. W. 122.
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services rendered, can it be said that the agent has any sort of
an equitable lien on renewal premiums, or an equitable assign-
ment thereto for his commissions, which will enable him to follow
the premiums after termination of his contract, into the hands
of a third person who was not a party to the basic agency con-
tract?
It is fundamental that to constitute an equitable lien on a fund
the debtor must irrevocably appropriate the subject matter to the
creditor by order or assignment in such a manner that the holder
of the fund is authorized to pay the amount directly to the
creditor without intervention of the debtor, 34 and that a mere
expectation or agreement to pay a debt out of a particular fund
when the fund arises, does not establish an equitable lien upon
the fund 5
It would be virtually inconceivable and certainly opposed to all
recognized practices and basic principles of insurance, for the
parties to an agency contract to contemplate that the agent should
have the right to hold or to look to the policyholder for a given
renewal commission on a premium about to be paid, or that the
policyholder under ordinary circumstances could be required to
pay any part of the renewal premiums to the agent, or that the
company should intend expressly to appropriate or assign a cer-
tain percentage of the renewal premium to the agent as his
renewal commission, all of which would be necessary incidents
in the event of an equitable lien or assignment.36
Thus the Massachusetts Supreme Court has held that the in-
surance company is entitled exclusively to the premium, and that,
as against the insured, the agent can claim no lien on the premium
for his commissions.3 7
In a recent Federal case3 8 an auditor contracted with a com-
34Jones on Liens, Volume 1, paragraph 52; Wright v. Ellison (1864)
1 Wall. 16, 17 L. Ed. 555; Franklin v. Browning (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) 117 F.
226; 19 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law (1901) 2d ed. 16.
35 Christmas v. Russel (1871) 114 Wall. 69, 20 L. Ed. 792; Jones on Liens
Volume 1, paragraph 48; Great Northern State Bank v. Ryan (C. C. A. 8th,
1923) 292 Fed. 10.
36 In Machette v. Hodges, 6 Philadelphia (Pa.) 296 (1867) it was held
that an insurance agent whose agency has been terminated cannot enjoin
the company from receiving premiums although he may be entitled to a
commission thereon.
37 Ide v. Aetna Insurance Co., et a]. (1919) 232 Mass. 523, 122 N. E. 654.
38 Goddes v. Reeves Coal & Dock Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 48.
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pany to audit its freight bills for overcharges, the consideration
for this work to be 50% of the refunds. Plaintiff made the audit
and filed claim for refunds, but prior to the time the refunds were
actually made by the carrier, the company was adjudged a bank-
rupt. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the auditor
had an equitable lien in the refund and was therefore a preferred
creditor, for the following reason, however:
"The contract was that the dock company should pay him
50% of any refunds received by it, not a 50% commission
on them, or a sum equal to 50% of them, but 50%, one-half,
of the very refunds the dock company received."
Consistent with the tenor of this case, if agency contracts were
to provide that the agent is to receive a certain percentage of
the renewal premium itself, there would be grounds for a possible
equitable lien. The distinction is insignificant, however, when it
is borne in mind that the average agency contract provides for
payment to the agent, not of a percentage of the renewal premium
itself, but only commissions in terms of sums measured by and
equal to a certain percentage of the renewal premium paid.
It is submitted as a conclusion, therefore, that the agent has
neither a vested interest in, nor an equitable lien or assignment
to, renewal premiums paid either to the contracting or successor
company, and that a rational interpretation of the usual agency
contract insofar as it relates to renewal commissions, may be
said to be something as follows:
The company agrees to pay the agent as the consideration
for his services in negotiating the policy and in servicing the
risk after procurement, a first year commission measured by
a certain percentage of the first year's premium, and also
renewal commissions measured by a smaller percentage of a
limited number of renewal premiums, only however, when,
as and if such premiums are paid to the contracting company
in cash.
Aside from the foregoing treatment of the effects of company
liquidation on the agent's rights to renewal commissions, there is
another question in the realm of agency renewal commissions,
which, whether the contract is terminated or not, is frequently
a cause of concern to some of the companies.
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IV. IS THE AGENT ENTITLED TO RENEWAL COMMISSIONS ON
PREMIUMS WAIVED UNDER THE TOTAL AND PERMANENT
DISABILITY FEATURE OF A POLICY?
While the agency contracts of a number of companies expressly
stipulate that renewal commissions will not be paid on premiums
waived because of total and permanent disability, the question
becomes a problem in connection with those agency contracts
which are silent on the subject.
As previously indicated, an express provision that the renewal
commission will be paid only as and when the renewal premium
is paid in cash to the company, is common to the agency contracts
of practically all companies.
It is contended by the agent that while it is conceded that the
premium must be paid before the commission is allowable, the
contract does not provide that the insured necessarily must pay
such premium, that after approval of a disability claim the pre-
mium is technically being paid by the company from a disability
reserve fund set aside by the company for such purposes out of
the additional disability premium; that therefore the agent is
entitled to renewal commissions on premiums so paid, and that
to deprive him of such commissions is to penalize him for his
additional effort in inducing the insured to take the disability
coverage with its extra premium.
However, it is contended for the company that the parties in-
tend, in stipulating that renewal commissions are to be paid only
on renewal premiums paid in cash to the company, that renewal
premiums on which renewal commissions are expected to be paid,
are only those premiums which are actually paid in cash by the
insured to the company; that the waiver of premiums on account
of disability is in no sense the payment of premiums by the com-
pany to itself, but is only an intra-office bookkeeping transaction,
necessitated by actuarial considerations in order to make the
premium waiver effective.
A survey of the authorities reveals only two reported cases
dealing directly with this situation.
One is that of Handshoe v. The Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety of the United States.s There the agent's contract provided
39 Opinion of Municipal Court of City of New York was originally re-
ported at 277 N. Y. S. 117 (1934). Per Curiam opinion of New York Su-
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for commissions only on "premiums as paid in cash" to the com-
pany. Suit was brought to recover renewal commissions on two
premiums waived by the company on account of the insured's
total and permanent disability. The company contended that
premiums waived by reason of disability were not premiums paid
in cash to the company. It was stipulated between the parties
that it was a practice of the company, when a gross premium
was paid, to allocate it to the renewal premium life account, and
to the renewal premium disability account, and when a claim for
disability benefits was allowed involving the waiver of a pre-
mium, it was the custom to compute the net annual life premiums
under the policy, to total all such net annual life premiums falling
due in that month on disability cases, to debit this total to a
separate account known as the "premiums waived on account of
disability," and at the same time to credit it to an account known
as the "renewal premiums life account." Judgment for the plain-
tiff by a New York City Municipal Court, apparently on the
grounds that such a bookkeeping transaction did actually con-
stitute a payment of the premium in cash by the company, was
in April, 1933, reversed by the New York Supreme Court. That
court in only a per curiam opinion said:
"Under the terms of the agency contract the plaintiff's as-
signor was not entitled to commissions on premiums waived
by the company pursuant to the policy during the period of
disability."
The one other case found on the subject is that of Pick v. State
Mutual Life Assurance Company, decided by the Illinois Appel-
late Court, First District, on appeal from the Municipal Court of
Chicago. 40 There the agency contract differed from that in the
Handshoe case in that it provided only for thi payment of re-
newal commissions as the premiums were paid, without the addi-
tional requirement that the premiums must be paid in cash to the
Company. The appellate court in affirming the judgment for the
agent, declared, as contended by the agent, that where a premium
is waived by the company it is paid from a special fund set up
by the company to take care of disability claims, and disagreed
with the company's position that the waiver of the premium was
preme Court reversing judgment of Municipal Court, is not found to be
officially reported.
40 (1933) 272 Il1. App. 602.
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but a bookkeeping transaction in which the company simply took
money out of one pocket and put it in another.41
However, in the opinion of the writer, an analysis of agency
commissions both first year and renewal, that is, as to their in-
herent character and nature, their purpose and functions, as
seemingly understood by the parties, will afford a solution of this
problem of liability for renewal commissions on premiums waived
by disability, on an additional basis, different somewhat from
that employed in the Handshoe and Pick cases.
Agency contract commissions are compensation for what? Is
the negotiation and intial procurement of the risk alone the
singular consideration for the payment of both first year and
renewal commissions, with no intent by the parties that the re-
newal commissions are to be the fruit of the agent's labor in
seeing that the policy is continued in force and renewal premiums
paid? Or, on the other hand, is it not the intention of the parties
that the first year commission is to fully and completely com-
pensate the agent for his services in orginally procuring the risk,
and that payment of renewal commissions is associated with a
continuance of the risk, that is, a form of year to year remunera-
tion to the agent for his services, after negotiation of the risk, in
seeing that the policy is maintained in force?
It is the view of the writer, that renewal commissions are
basically intended as compensation for influence; that they are
conceived as remuneration to the agent for his diligent efforts
and his influence after procurement of the risk in "keeping the
policyholder sold," in seeing that the policy does not lapse nor
is surrendered, and in either himself collecting the renewal pre-
mium for the company or in seeing that it is paid to the company.
Thus, as was said in the case of King v. Raleigh,'42
"The courts ... proceed on the notion that the compensa-
tion to be received by the agent . ..on renewal premiums,
is associated with the continuance of his agency ... the
41 The writer is indebted to Mr. Sterling Pierson, and Messrs. Alexander
& Green, General Solicitor and General Counsel, respectively, for the Equi-
table Life Assurance Society of the United States, through whom copies of
the record and briefs in the Handshoe case were made available for use; also
to Mr. Irving T. F. Ring, General Counsel for the State Mutual Life Assur-
ance Company, who furnished for perusal, copies of opinions, briefs et
cetera in the Pick Case.
42 See supra footnote 3.
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purpose being to bind him to steady work in behalf of the
company."43
To be sure, if the agent's contract is terminated, a collection
fee is ordinarily imposed against his renewals, which represents
the cost of the company of servicing the collection of premiums
previously collected through the agent. But even though his con-
tract has been terminated and renewal premiums are being col-
lected directly by the company, the renewal commission less
collection fee, is nevertheless held out as an inducement to the
former agent to exert his influence in seeing that policy is main-
tained in force, in occasionally calling on the policyholder, or in
reminding Bill Smith that he has a renewal premium due next
week. The company realizes that the agent is the dominant force
in bringing company and policy holder together, that he is the
motivating influence with the policyholder, and that without the
renewal commissions there would be no inducement to the agent
to seek the yearly renewal of the policy.
But the value of influence can be measured only in terms of
results. The agent's influence with the policyholder during a
given year is of commercial value to the company only in pro-
portion to whether or not the renewal premium for that year is
actually paid in cash, and that such is the intention of the parties
seems evident from the fact that they have seen fit by contract
to make the payment of the premium in cash a condition pre-
cedent to the payment of the renewal commission. Where, there-
fore, the premium is no longer actually paid by the insured, but
is being waived by the company on account of disability, the
agent's influence on the policyholder to pay a renewal premium
is no longer a thing of value to the company, since the policy
during disability automatically continues in force without the
payment of premiums, agent or no agent. Does it not follow,
therefore, that where the need for the agent's influence has
ceased, it is intended by the parties that the consideration for
such influence, that is, the payment of renewal commissions,
shall also cease?
For two reasons, therefore, it is suggested that the agent by
43 Also see Andrews v. Public Savings Insurance Co., 141 N. E. 646, in
which it was said "It is to the interest of an insurance company to have
contracts which will induce its agents to continue with their work," and see
Walker v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 79 Atl. 355, in which
it was held that renewals were not a part of compensation for writing the
policy, but only for collecting future renewal premiums.
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right is not entitled to renewal commissions on premiums waived
by disability:
(1) because such waiver of premium neither in fact or
theory constitutes a "payment of the premium in cash to the
company" as required by most agency contracts, and
(2) because the agent, as apparently intended by the par-
ties, is to be paid a renewal commission only when his efforts
result in the payment by the insured of a given renewal
premium, so that where the necessity for the payment of
such renewal premium ceases, the right of the agent to a
renewal commission thereon likewise ceases.
Where, however, a premium is advanced by the company,
through the exercise of the automatic premium loan privilege of
the policy, there appears a greater justification for the agent's
claim to a renewal commission on a premium so advanced, than
in the case of a premium waived on account of disability.
This seems true, first, because a premium advanced by the
automatic premium loan is necessarily a charge against the
policy, ultimately to be paid or accounted for in one form or an-
other by the insured, and therefore, might be classified literally
as a "premium paid to the company," as required by the agency
contract for the payment of renewal commissions.
Secondly, in the case of an automatic premium loan, unlike a
waiver of the premium by disability, the influence of the agent
on the policyholder often has a distinct value to the company, in
that frequently the policyholder, when in financial straits, would
no doubt surrender or abandon his policy except for the influence
of the agent in showing him the wisdom of permitting an opera-
tion of the automatic premium loan to save the policy. If, there-
fore, it can be said that the effect of the agent's influence is being
felt by the company when the policy is kept in force by the auto-
matic premium loan, such influence is a thing of value to the
company, and the self same considerations exist for the payment
of a renewal commission as when a premium is actually paid to
the company in cash by the insured.
In the absence of substantial judicial precedent to follow, the
foregoing views on the rights of the agent to renewal commis-
sions where the premium is waived by disability or advanced by
the automatic premium loan, are based necessarily upon a con-
sideration of the purposes which the parties seemingly intend
that a renewal commission shall serve.
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